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The political performances of Dutch anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders revolve 
around a combination of giving and taking offense.1 Wilders thrives on qualifying 
Islam as a “sick,” “fascist,” and “totalitarian ideology”; proposing to ban “the 
Qur’an, the Islamic Mein Kampf”; advocating a “head rag tax” [kopvoddentaks] on 
wearing a hijab in public; arguing that “Moroccan hooligans should be shot in the 
knees,” and calling government ministers “traitors”; “cowards”; or “completely in-
sane” [knettergek] during parliamentary debates.2 Wilders grounds his offensive 
rhetoric in indignation, taking offense both to Muslims and to “the politically cor-
rect elite” of “multiculturalist” “traitors” and “cowards” who seek to suppress his 
courageous resistance to the “Muslim colonizers,” a term by which he refers to the 
unskilled labor immigrants who were recruited as “guest workers” from rural re-
gions of Turkey and Morocco in the 1960s and 1970s, together with refugee fam-
ilies from Arab countries. 
 
In this article, I develop a critique of Wilders’ politics of offense by revisiting two 
classic texts of Frankfurt School critical theory that combine social theory with 
psychoanalysis: Herbert Marcuse’s 1965 essay, “Repressive Tolerance” (Marcuse 
1969) and Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s chapter, “Elements of Anti-
Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment” from Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944; the 
arguments I focus on are generally considered to have been written primarily by 
Adorno) (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). Both texts seek to understand reaction-
ary mobilizations of political affect in relation to dominant forms of liberalism that 
do not live up to their promise of realizing what critical theorists insist on calling 
true freedom. I will demonstrate how this comprehensive approach makes revisit-
ing these texts useful for critiquing reactionary mobilizations of political affect in 
the present. 
 
Rereading “Repressive Tolerance” and “Elements of Anti-Semitism” at a time when 
electoral politics in various countries seem to have been reduced to a choice be-
tween neoliberalism and anti-Islam/anti-immigrant populism—Hillary Clinton 
versus Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron versus Marine Le Pen, Austrian presi-
dent Alexander Van der Bellen versus FPÖ-chairperson Heinz-Christian Strache, 
Dutch prime-minister Mark Rutte versus Geert Wilders—suggests good reasons 
for analyzing such given alternatives not in isolation, but in relation to each other. 
Thus, I analyze the various ways in which Wilders’ politics of offense relates to 
discourses of tolerance that neutralize critique and political opposition; discourses 
of secularism that define themselves in opposition to the religion of others and 
proscribe the public expression of religious difference; discourses of color blindness 
that disavow the racial and ethnic positioning of the white majority and deny the 
existence of racism; and discourses of individual freedom that only promote the 
needs of capital. I also hope to demonstrate the use of analyzing Wilders’ mobili-
zations of political affect, through giving and taking offense, in psychoanalytic 
terms, as instances of what Marcuse called “repressive desublimation”: the removal 
of some societal barriers to instinctual gratification, not for the sake of liberation, 
but in the interest of a different kind of domination. 
 
Of course, the point of revisiting “Repressive Tolerance” and “Elements of Anti-
Semitism” in order to critique Wilders’ anti-Islam populism is not simply to extract 
a series of insights from these texts and “apply” those insights to Wilders’ politics 
of offense. “Repressive Tolerance” and “Elements of Anti-Semitism” are analyses 
of, and interventions in, specific historical constellations—the United States in the 
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mid-1960s and Nazi Germany, respectively—and a return to earlier works of critical 
theory in order to illuminate the present is only useful if it includes historical 
comparison. I will begin with a brief overview of Wilders’ political career; readers 
familiar with this history may skip the next three paragraphs. 
 
 
Critiquing Tolerance: Political Incorrectness as Repressive  
Desublimation  
 
In September 2004, Geert Wilders left the right-wing People’s Party for Freedom 
and Democracy (VVD), after party leader Jozias van Aartsen demanded that he 
adopt a more “moderate” tone in his critique of Islam. As a Member of Parliament 
for the VVD, Wilders had co-authored an op-ed with anti-Islam ideologue Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali, who was then also an MP for the VVD, titled, “The Time has Come for 
a Liberal Jihad,” which advocated the suspension of the constitutional rights of 
Dutch Muslims in order to “[c]ounter the monopoly of the extremist imams on 
the minds of the young” (Hirsi Ali and Wilders 2003). Wilders had also co-au-
thored a manifesto proposing that “radical Muslims” be expelled from the Nether-
lands “without mercy” [zonder pardon], and that Turkey never be allowed to join 
the European Union because of its majority Muslim population (Wilders and 
Oplaat 2004). Finally, Wilders had proposed a prohibition on wearing headscarves, 
and said in an interview: “Let the headscarves wave on the Malieveld [a large field 
in The Hague that is used for political protests]. I eat them for breakfast [Ik lust 
ze rauw]” (Wilders 2004). 
 
After leaving the VVD, Wilders founded his own political movement that he would 
later call the Freedom Party [Partij voor de Vrijheid], outlining its program in a 
“Declaration of Independence.” Evoking the 1581 Act of Abjuration with which 
the Dutch Low Countries declared independence from the Spanish king who, as 
Wilders put it, “[b]elieved that the people [volk] were there for him, not the other 
way around,” Wilders argued the necessity of a new Declaration of Independence, 
because “the people” were once again “held hostage” by a “complacent” “political 
elite” of “cowardly and fearful people” who “remained deaf to the problems that 
ordinary people struggle with every day” (Wilders 2005). “Freeing ourselves” from 
this elite, Wilders proclaimed, “we can shape history, take our fate as a people in 
our own hands”; inaugurate “a new Golden Age” (a reference to the seventeenth 
century, when the Dutch Republic was a major imperialist power);3 and fight for 
“a Netherlands that maintains its own identity and is proud of it; that does not let 
itself be taken over by cultures that are foreign to its essence [wezensvreemd], or 
lets [sic] its identity be diluted by losing itself in supranational institutions” (Wil-
ders 2005). In his 2006 election program, Klare wijn (“Straight Talk”), Wilders 
proposed abolishing the first article of the Dutch Constitution, which prohibits 
discrimination, and inserting a proclamation that “the Judeo-Christian and hu-
manistic tradition” is “the dominant culture” (Wilders 2006b). 
 
In the 2006 national elections, Wilders won nine of the hundred-and-fifty seats in 
parliament; in the 2010 elections he obtained an additional fifteen, and from Oc-
tober 2010 to November 2012, Wilders supported the minority coalition of Chris-
tian Democrats and the VVD through a so-called “Tolerance Pact” 
[Gedoogakkoord]: Wilders’ Freedom Party tolerated (i.e. voted with) the minority 
government in exchange for a number of political deals. These deals included dras-
tic cuts of the culture budget, which, according to Wilders, only benefited “the 
leftist elite” (museums that were considered to conserve “the Dutch heritage” were 
spared, with the notable exception of the National Institute for the Study of Dutch 
Slavery). The deals also included Dutch vetoes of European Union resolutions con-
demning Israel’s settlement policies in the West Bank (the Freedom Party’s foreign 
policy focuses almost exclusively on supporting the Israeli far-right, because Wil-
ders considers Israel “the West’s first line of defense” against Islam, the “buffer 
[stootkussen] of the jihad”) (Liphshiz 2009). During the 2014 municipal election 
night, Wilders asked his audience: “Do you want more or fewer Moroccans in this 
city and in the Netherlands,” provoking them to chant, “Fewer, fewer, fewer!” and 
promising that he would “take care of that.”4 The Freedom Party’s 2017 election 
program, “The Netherlands Ours Again,” proposes closing the borders to all refu-
gees, as well as to all immigrants from “Islamic countries”; closing all mosques and 
all Islamic schools; banning the Qur’an; and putting “radical Muslims” in “preven-
tive detention.” Wilders obtained twenty seats in the 2017 national elections. 
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Curiously, Wilders’ critique of the “politically correct elite” bears some resemblance 
to Herbert Marcuse’s critique of tolerance in “Repressive Tolerance.” In that essay, 
Marcuse argued that tolerance was originally, at the beginning of the modern pe-
riod, “a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notion and practice” with which “au-
thentic liberals” sought to confront arbitrary domination by feudal powers (Mar-
cuse 1969, 81). However, Marcuse submitted, tolerance had degenerated into an 
anti-political ideology that sought to neutralize any critique of the status quo, 
which Marcuse, writing in the United States in the middle of the Vietnam War 
and after the murders of several Civil Rights Movement activists, saw as a “state of 
violence and suppression on a global scale” (Marcuse 1969, 82). Under repressive 
tolerance, Marcuse argued, “[i]t is the people who tolerate the government, which 
in turn tolerates opposition within the framework determined by the constituted 
authorities” (Marcuse 1969, 82-3).5 According to Marcuse, repressive tolerance op-
erated through indoctrination by the media, which prevented radical critique by 
neutralizing dissent: “Under the rule of monopolistic media—themselves the mere 
instruments of economic and political power—a mentality is created for which 
right and wrong, true and false are predefined wherever they affect the vital inter-
ests of the society” (Marcuse 1969, 95). The “public language” “administered” by 
the mass media, Marcuse submitted, immediately subsumed the negativity of dis-
sent under the positivity of “the normal course of events” (Marcuse 1969, 93). 
Therefore, Marcuse argued, it was necessary to “break through” “the existing pos-
itive” established by the public language, to open up space for negative critique in 
the interest of liberation and a freedom that is “still to be created” (Marcuse 1969, 
87). 
 
A contemporary example of what Marcuse criticized as repressive tolerance is the 
2010 congress of the Dutch Christian-Democratic Party that decided on the col-
laboration with Wilders that I described above: Wilders’ support for a minority 
government coalition of Christian Democrats and the VVD in exchange for the 
realization of some parts of Wilders’ political program. Overjoyed with the out-
come, which enabled him to become the Deputy Prime Minister, Christian Dem-
ocratic party leader Maxime Verhagen notoriously described the congress as “a feast 
for democracy” (Stokmans 2010). After all, proper procedure had been followed: 
party members who opposed the collaboration had been allowed to voice their dis-
sent, and the decision had been put to a vote. A Marcusean analysis of this party 
congress might be that the party leadership had successfully managed to adminis-
trate the congress via a public language that normalized Wilders’ blatant racism as 
political disagreement. Indeed, at the press conference where the new minority 
government presented the “Tolerance Pact” with Wilders, Prime Minister Mark 
Rutte announced that the three parties had decided to “respect” each other in their 
differing positions on Islam (Persconferentie 2010). 
 
However, repressive tolerance takes different forms today as well, such as the abuse 
of anti-discrimination law to smother political opposition. For instance, on Octo-
ber 20, 2015, the French Court of Cassation upheld a 2013 conviction of fourteen 
activists to pay 1000 euro fines each and 28,000 euros in civil damages for entering 
a supermarket while wearing T-shirts with the slogan, “Palestine shall live, boycott 
Israel,” and handing out flyers with the text, “Boycott products imported from 
Israel, to buy products imported from Israel is to legitimize the crimes in Gaza, to 
approve of the politics of the Israeli government” (Médard 2015).6 The activists 
had been convicted under the Law on Freedom of the Press, which prohibits “in-
citement to discrimination, hatred, or violence towards a group of persons because 
of their origin or belonging to an ethnicity, race, religion, or specific nation”7; 
prosecution had been mandated by the central government.8 According to the 
courts, the activists had incited [provocation] discrimination against Israeli produc-
ers and suppliers. A Marcusean critique of this conviction would be that the activ-
ists were convicted for their supposed intolerance towards Israeli producers and 
suppliers—a far-fetched charge, given that the boycott was targeting products, not 
persons, and that it had a political aim: to pressure the Israeli government to com-
ply with international law—while the French government tolerates, condones, and 
even facilitates the ongoing structural violence that the Israeli state inflicts on Pal-
estinians. 
 
A related example of repressive tolerance in the present is the 2012 criminal con-
viction of four members of the feminist punk rock group Pussy Riot who had 
performed a “punk prayer” in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, as a 
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protest against Vladimir Putin and the Orthodox Patriarch’s endorsement of Putin. 
Among other things, the women were convicted of “offending the feelings of be-
lievers” (Lipman 2012a and 2012b). Disturbingly, this phrase originates in a 1994 
landmark judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Otto Preminger In-
stitut v. Austria, which did not find for a violation of an Austrian movie theater’s 
freedom of expression when local government authorities prevented a screening of 
Werner Schroeter’s film adaptation of Oskar Panizza’s 1895 anti-Catholic play, The 
Council of Love. The European Court had argued: “The Court cannot disregard the 
fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the overwhelming majority 
of Tyroleans. In seizing the film, the Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious 
peace in that region and to prevent that some people should feel the object of 
attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner.”9 Ignor-
ing the critical thrust of the protest performance and of the film, and reframing 
the challenges they pose to the political role of powerful religious institutions as 
“attacks on feelings,” these judgments enforce a model of repressive tolerance that 
mandates the avoidance of offense and respect for “feelings” in the name of ensur-
ing (religious) peace. 
 
Instances of repressive tolerance abound, and there is plenty of reason to oppose 
contemporary imperatives to avoid offense that neutralize critiques of the status 
quo.10 However, Wilders’ “critique” of contemporary discourses of tolerance is a 
very different one: what Wilders attacks is the supposed permissiveness of a regime 
that allows Muslims to exercise their freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and 
freedom of assembly, and that thus permits the expression of cultural and religious 
difference in public, while censoring “critics” as racists. Thus, Marcuse’s argument 
is turned around completely. It is crucial to observe, however, that the upshot of 
Wilders’ supposed radical critique is generally an affirmation of, rather than a chal-
lenge to the status quo, if it is not simply destructive of the fundamental rights of 
others and of institutions of the rule of law, such as the courts where he has had 
to stand trial for some of his rhetoric. For although Wilders occasionally claims 
that multicultural tolerance is the ideological prop for the elite’s selling-out the 
nation and promotion of “mass immigration” in order to destroy the accomplish-
ments of the welfare state for “ordinary Dutch people,” his party in fact often votes 
for the neoliberal resolutions put forward by his former party, the VVD (Pelgrim 
and Steenbergen 2017). 
 
Indeed, although Wilders consistently presents his offensive rhetoric as an attempt 
to break through a repressive regime of multicultural tolerance, his rhetoric itself 
is a textbook example of the affective mechanism of repressive tolerance, which 
Marcuse called “repressive desublimation”: taking away some societal barriers to 
instinctual gratification in the interest of domination. Marcuse based his analyses 
of repressive desublimation on Freud’s concept of sublimation: the process by 
which an individual’s impulses are diverted from their sexual aims and directed 
towards socially-valued objects (Laplanche and Pontalis 2004, 465-467). Freud saw 
civilization as the result of continuous sublimation by individuals, who are initially 
pressured by their parents and by society, and who later pressure themselves to 
renounce the sexual aims of their impulses and redirect these impulses towards 
work, affection, friendship, artistic creation, intellectual inquiry, etc. In Civilization 
and Its Discontents, Freud saw civilization’s sublimation of people’s impulses as in-
evitably causing a considerable amount of unhappiness, which would periodically 
erupt into orgies of violence against perceived “outsiders” (Freud 2010, 72-3). By 
contrast, Marcuse argued in Eros and Civilization that unhappiness was not the 
inevitable result of the sublimation demanded by civilization as such, but of the 
sublimation imposed by a repressive civilization in the interest of domination (Mar-
cuse 1962, 71-95). For Marcuse, sublimation was by no means intrinsically repres-
sive: he argued that a civilization in which people liberated themselves from dom-
ination would allow for a nonrepressive sublimation of their impulses, which could 
be directed towards all kinds of free activities, relationships, and objects that could 
have an erotic charge that would not be limited to sex, and that, unlike repressive 
desublimation, would provide true gratification. 
 
Crucially, then, for Marcuse, the purpose of critique—liberation—is not desubli-
mation: removing the societal sublimation of the impulses of its members alto-
gether. Instead, the purpose of critique is to substitute a nonrepressive for a repres-
sive sublimation, that is, to reorganize the ways in which society sublimates the 
impulses of its members, to get rid of structures of domination and instead create 
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a free society in which people are able to determine their own lives together with 
others. By contrast, repressive desublimation allows individuals to indulge their 
impulses in ways that give a certain kind of pleasure, but that serve the forces of 
domination. 
 
Although Wilders grounds his offense in an opposition against a permissiveness 
that he claims to be repressive, his rhetoric of offense, far from being oriented 
towards a nonrepressive sublimation, in fact allows for the repressive desublimation 
of his audience’s impulses, directing them against Muslims. This repressive desub-
limation often operates through laughter. Consider Wilders’ notorious proposal for 
a kopvoddentaks, a “head rag tax,”11 during the parliamentary debate on the 2010 
budget, which I will quote at some length in order to give a sample of his rhetoric: 
 
“This government, this elite, does not have the slightest will to resist (…) Islami-
zation. It sees it as a beautiful enrichment of the Dutch landscape. All those cozy 
mosques, all those nice headscarves, all those snug burqas: they really make the 
Netherlands a lot prettier. Here and there someone drops dead, occasionally some-
one gets raped, and the country is going bankrupt at some point, but that cannot 
spoil the fun. That is mere detail. Just be patient for a little longer, and then the 
Islamic utopia awaits us. 
 
A better environment begins with you. A great many Dutch people are annoyed 
[ergeren zich] at the pollution of public space by Islam. In other words, in certain 
places our street scene more and more resembles the street scene in Mecca or Teh-
ran: headscarves, haardbaarden,12 burqas, and men in weird long white dresses. Let 
us do something about that for once. Let us reconquer our streets. Let us ensure 
that the Netherlands is finally going to resemble the Netherlands again. Those 
headscarves really are a symbol of female oppression, a sign of subjection, a sign of 
conquest. They form a symbol of an ideology that intends to colonize us. There-
fore, the time has come for a great cleaning of our streets. If our nieuwe Nederland-
ers13 like to show their love for this seventh-century desert ideology, they should 
do so in an Islamic country, but not here. Not in the Netherlands. 
 
The Netherlands has excise taxes. We have excises on gas and diesel. We have 
excises on parking. We have excises on dogs. We used to have excises on flying. 
We still have excises on packaging materials. My first proposal: why not the intro-
duction of a headscarf tax? I would like to call it a kopvoddentaks. Just get a permit 
once a year and pay right away. A thousand Euros a year seems like a nice amount 
to me. Then we will finally earn back a little of what has already cost us so much. 
I would say: the polluter pays” (Algemene beschouwingen miljoenennota 2010, 
2009). 
 
With its rhetoric of nationalism, pollution, and cleaning, and a supposed conquest 
or colonization of “our” space by something that does not resemble “the Nether-
lands,” this speech uses an imagery of ethnic cleansing and contains an urgent call 
to action (“Let us reconquer our streets”). However, this hyperbolic, sarcastic pro-
posal is also intended humorously. Wilders’ parodic appropriation of a government 
slogan from the 1990s promoting environmental awareness (“A better environment 
begins with you”) and of a principle of environmental law (“The polluter pays”) are 
intended to provoke laughter, because Wilders generally dismisses any environ-
mental policy as a “leftist hobby.” The concrete proposal that Wilders launches—
to impose a tax on wearing headscarves—is not only impossible to realize because 
it would violate the Dutch Constitution and human rights law: it is also diametri-
cally opposed to Wilders’ frequent insistence on smaller government, less bureau-
cracy, and lower taxes, not to mention the word “freedom” in the name of his party. 
And the highly offensive word kopvoddentaks—an onomatopoeia of Wilders’ dis-
gust of head scarfs, with its sequence of consonants that almost need to be spat out 
in order to pronounce them—is a farcical neologism that underscores the prepos-
terous nature of the proposal. The pleasure that this rhetoric can give to some of 
Wilders’ supporters might be considered a typical example of what Marcuse called 
repressive desublimation. 
 
To further elaborate my critique of Wilders’ politics of offense, I turn, in the next 
section, to an earlier work of critical theory: Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. 
Adorno’s “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment” from Dialectic of 
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Enlightenment.14 Although Horkheimer and Adorno do not use the term “repres-
sive desublimation,” their analysis of anti-Semitism as a “counterrevolutionary” in-
strumentalization of “the rebellion of oppressed nature against domination,” which 
also builds on the later work of Freud, has many similarities with Marcuse’s writ-
ings.15 Returning to “Elements of Anti-Semitism” is useful for analyzing Wilders’ 
rhetoric of offense, because whereas Marcuse focuses on the commodified gratifi-
cation of sexual desires, the satisfaction of material pseudo-needs, and the depolit-
icized release of privatized frustration,16 Horkheimer and Adorno concentrate on 
Freud’s primary example of repressive desublimation in Civilization and Its Discon-
tents, namely anti-Semitism (Freud 2010, 72-3). Furthermore, an important ele-
ment in Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis of anti-Semitism is laughter. 
 
 
Offense and Mimesis: Paranoia, Projection, Ridicule 
 
At the heart of “Elements of Anti-Semitism” is the thesis that anti-Semitism is a 
false projection of the self’s internal impulses of fear and hostility onto an “other.” 
This false projection is an inversion of a “true” or “human” way of relating to the 
world, which Horkheimer and Adorno designate with the paradoxical term, “au-
thentic mimesis”: the “capacity (…) for reflection as an interpenetration of recep-
tivity and imagination” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 164-165). Anti-Semitism’s 
pathological inversion of authentic mimesis takes place as a reaction against the 
repression of mimesis by what Horkheimer and Adorno call the “existing univer-
sal,” as opposed to the yet-to-be-realized universal of a truly free society. They 
describe the existing universal as an “empty,” purely instrumental form of ration-
ality that has its origins in ancient Greece, but that has almost completely come to 
dominate society with the development of modern technology and capitalism. 
 
According to Horkheimer and Adorno, giving and taking offense are central to the 
anti-Semitic reaction against this existing universal. With a historical stroke that 
is as broad as Freud’s in Civilization and Its Discontent, which they cite in the 
footnotes, Horkheimer and Adorno argue: “Civilization has replaced the organic 
adaptation to otherness, i.e. mimetic behavior proper, initially, in the magical 
phase, with the organized manipulation of mimesis, and finally, in the historical 
phase, with rational practice, work. Uncontrolled mimesis is ostracized” (Hork-
heimer and Adorno 2002, 148). With the triumph of technology in “late capital-
ism,” they contend: “All that remains of the adaptation to nature is the hardening 
against it,” that is, “the blind mastery of nature, which is identical to farsighted 
instrumentality” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 149). However, mimesis reap-
pears in encounters with others whose mimetic gestures are perceived as offensive 
(anstößig). Evoking—in a rather problematic way—contemporary stereotypes of 
“Ostjuden,” Jewish people of Eastern European origin, Horkheimer and Adorno 
suggest that Jewish people display, in their gestures and emotions, an “obsolete 
merchant behavior” that confronts Germans who are not Jewish with their re-
pressed humanity, because this behavior is at least somewhat mimetic.17 According 
to Horkheimer and Adorno, the offense taken to the mimetic gestures or emotions 
of others leads those who take offense not primarily to a renewed identification 
with the proscription of mimesis by the existing universal, but to an indulgence of 
their own mimetic drive in a form that makes this indulgence only a “wretched 
parody of fulfillment.” With anti-Semitism, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, taking 
offense becomes a pretext for an exclusionary group formation that takes place 
through the repressive pleasure of indulging the repressed mimetic drive, which 
often happens through laughter, ridiculing, or guffawing that is merely a parody of 
true joy and happiness. Anti-Semitism allows individuals to indulge their mimetic 
drive in a repressive way, both through their participation in the fascist apparatus 
that manipulates this drive, and vicariously, through the caricatural performances 
of anti-Semitic leaders: 
 
“The Führer, with his ham actor’s face and his charisma of crankable hysteria, leads 
the round dance. His performance accomplishes by proxy and in effigy what is 
denied to everyone else in reality. Hitler can gesticulate like a clown, Mussolini 
risk false notes like a provincial tenor, Goebbels talk as glibly as the Jewish agent 
whose murder he is recommending, Coughlin18 preach love like the Savior himself, 
whose crucifixion he impersonates for the sake of always more bloodshed. Fascism 
is also totalitarian in that it seeks to make the rebellion of oppressed nature against 
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domination immediately useful for domination” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 
153). 
 
What might be the relevance of “Elements of Anti-Semitism” for an analysis of 
Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam politics of offense? The rapid acceleration of globaliza-
tion during the last few decades has intensified the hegemony of what Horkheimer 
and Adorno saw as the “existing universal.” More than ever before, the “rationality” 
of capital, and the discourses of liberal individualism that often accompany it, sup-
press, or render irrelevant, modes of identification and affiliation that have an es-
sential mimetic component, such as national, linguistic, cultural, racial, ethnic, 
familial, professional, political, and religious identifications and affiliations (Balibar 
2002 and 2011). National identifications are rendered less relevant with the nation-
state’s diminishing role as the primary unit of political, social, and economic or-
ganization, and declared obsolete in the name of certain versions of cosmopolitan-
ism. Linguistic identifications are rendered less important by the increasing use of 
“global” English as the default language. Professional identifications are rendered 
irrelevant by the deprofessionalization, in the name of free competition, of work 
that used to require formal training or membership of professional organizations. 
Religious identifications and affiliations are relegated entirely to the private sphere 
by discourses of secularism that reduce religion to an individual (lifestyle) choice 
and proscribe religious expression in public (Asad 2003). And racial or ethnic dif-
ference is disavowed by a discourse of color blindness that refuses to acknowledge 
racial or ethnic privilege and categorically denies the existence of racism. 
 
Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam politics of offense can be interpreted as a reaction against 
the manifestation of these universals in the Netherlands. Against the universality 
of capital, cosmopolitanism, secularism, and color blindness, the gestures, expres-
sions, emotions, languages, accents, voices, hairstyles, and clothing of Muslims—
or, sometimes more broadly, of presumed immigrants or allochthonen, those who 
originate from “other soil”—stand out as markedly different. An electorate that 
has internalized the proscription of mimesis, of identifying as being anything other 
than as private, self-possessed, entrepreneurial, secular, color blind, liberal individ-
uals, may perceive this difference as offensive. Indeed, the indignant and acrimo-
nious reactions against recent attempts to transform the figure of Black Pete, the 
notorious black-faced “helper” of the Dutch Santa Claus, suggest a similar mech-
anism. This indignation seems to stem from the confrontation with a historically—
more specifically: colonially—developed racial and ethnic difference in a context 
where, as Gloria Wekker observes in her recent book, White Innocence, “whiteness 
is not acknowledged as a racialized/ethnicized positioning at all” (Wekker 2016, 2). 
An interpretation of Wilders’ politics along the lines of “Elements of Anti-Semi-
tism” would be that Wilders taps into the offense that some people, alienated from 
their mimetic drive, take to the sensible difference of Muslims, and that he uses 
this offense to form an exclusionary collective by giving them license to indulge 
their impulses of hostility and mimesis, in a repressive way. 
 
Consider Wilders’ 2008 propaganda video Fitna (Wilders 2008). Fitna begins with 
an animation of a Koran that opens by itself: the left page shows the Danish car-
toon caricature of the prophet Muhammad wearing a bomb with a noisily burning 
fuse as a turban; the right page has a digital clock counting down seconds from 
fifteen minutes. A hand turns the page back; on the right is a Koran passage in 
Arabic; on the left, an English translation: “Surah 6, verse 60: Prepare for them 
whatever force and cavalry ye are able of gathering/to strike terror/to strike terror 
into the hearts of the enemies, of Allah and your enemies”; a voice-over recites the 
text in Arabic. The right page fades into footage of an airplane flying into the 
World Trade Center; this footage then goes full-screen, and the recitation fades 
into Edward Grieg’s mournful and majestic “Aase’s Death” from Peer Gynt. This 
alternation of Koran recitations and video footage continues for nine minutes. As 
well as the bombings in Madrid and London, the murder of Dutch filmmaker 
Theo van Gogh, and a decapitation, the footage also shows calls for violence ad-
dressed to agitated crowds, a three-year old girl asserting that the Koran teaches 
that Jews are apes and pigs, and veiled women holding up a sign that “Hitler was 
right.” 
 
The second half of the video is marked by the heading, “The Netherlands under 
the Spell of Islam,” and by a temporary transition from Grieg’s mourning to the 
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subdued orientalism of Tchaikovsky’s “Arabian Dance” from The Nutcracker. Foot-
age of Muslims in the Netherlands and statistics that show a sharp increase in the 
number of Muslims, still superimposed on a book page, blend into a postcard de-
picting five Dutch mosques and reading, “Greetings from the Netherlands,” with a 
voice-over of fundamentalist sermons recorded in Dutch mosques (translations are 
given in subtitles). The next heading reads: “The Netherlands in the Future?!” and 
is followed by footage of a stoning, a young girl with her legs tied together (pre-
sumably because her genitals have just been ritually mutilated), a man expressing 
his violent homophobia, etc., ultimately blending back into two Koran pages in 
Arabic. A hand appears and turns a page, the image turns black, with the sound of 
a page being torn out. Then follows the moral, in white letters: “The sound you 
heard was a page being removed from the phonebook. / For it is not up to me, but 
to Muslims themselves to tear out the hateful verses from the Koran.” After a few 
more lines, culminating in the slogan: “Stop Islamisation / Defend our freedom,” 
the cartoon of the bomb-turban reappears on a white page, the clock counts down 
to 00:00, and the explosion is represented as lightning, rumblings, and thunder. 
The Koran closes and the credits appear, listing Wilders as the script writer and 
“Scarlet Pimpernel” as the director and editor, reusing the pseudonym of the fic-
tional English fop whose heroism—helping French aristocrats escape the guillotine 
to England during the Terror—had to remain a secret, even to his tragically con-
fused wife.19 
 
Fitna casts Islam as a lawless force whose full catastrophic explosion is yet to come. 
Figuring the prophet Muhammad as a ticking time bomb, Fitna’s message, inserted 
immediately before the lightning, rumbling, and thunder at the end, is that “we”—
the Dutch, Europe, the West—need to arrest the countdown towards the apoca-
lypse and stop the “Islamisation” of “our” territory, restraining the imminent ex-
plosion of this lawless force into global violence. At the same time, Fitna shows 
resemblances to jihadist propaganda videos on the internet that draw on apocalyptic 
imagery from the Qur’an. Furthermore, the film uses an Islamic legal concept as 
its title (Wilders explained in an interview: “Islam and the Koran are my test. For 
me, the depraved [verderfelijke] Islam is fitna”), and Wilders frequently mimics 
other Islamic legal concepts as well: he has advocated the suspension of constitu-
tional rights for Muslims by arguing that the time has come for a “liberal jihad.” 
He has also dismissed critics of his anti-Islam rhetoric as dhimmis (non-Muslim 
subjects of a state governed by Sharia law), and he has used the concept of taqiyya 
to accuse Muslims of deception.20 Fitna and the jihad propaganda videos that it 
seems to mirror might both be analyzed as instances of repressive desublimation 
that emerge as reactions against a specific kind of globalization, mimicking each 
other’s paranoid projections of impulses of fear and hostility and thus foreclosing 
what Horkheimer and Adorno call “authentic mimesis,” reflective responsiveness 
to difference.21 
 
Another reason for returning to “Elements of Anti-Semitism” for interpreting 
Wilders’ rhetoric and imagery of offense might be that one of Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s main analytical moves is away from the “Jewish question” and towards 
the question of anti-Semitism. According to the analyses developed in “Elements 
of Anti-Semitism,” it is a mistake to treat the distinction between Jews and non-
Jews as a question that needs to be answered or as a problem that needs to be 
solved. The distinction between Jews and non-Jews only becomes a problem be-
cause of anti-Semitism, which emerges as a pathological reaction against the exist-
ing universal of liberal capitalism. The free society that is the horizon of Hork-
heimer and Adorno’s critical theory does not solve the supposed problem of Jewish 
particularism by sublating the distinction between Jews and non-Jews into a “true” 
universal. On the contrary: instead of imposing sameness, a truly free society, for 
Horkheimer and Adorno, would be a space for the free expression of difference and 
for the non-repressive, “authentic” mimesis of such difference.22 Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s critique of the “Jewish question” can inspire a critique of the proposition 
that Europe, or the Netherlands, has a “Muslim question” that needs to be an-
swered, a “Muslim problem” that needs to be solved, and it might suggest a shift 
of the analytical focus to the question of anti-Islam populism. 
 
Towards the end of Orientalism, Edward Said suggested that there was not just a 
structural similarity but also a historical continuity between anti-Semitism and 
post-World War II anti-Arab animus, an animus which he connected with “a fear 
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that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world” (Said 1978, 287). In his essay, 
Semites, Gil Anidjar argues that this suggestion, which remains undeveloped in 
Orientalism, “[s]hould have become an entire field of study” (Anidjar 2008, 122, 
endnote 76). Calling for analyses that recognize “[t]he ways in which these two 
political identities—the Jew, the Arab—have been coconstituted [sic] by, and most 
importantly, with and within Europe,” Anidjar asks: “What is Europe such that it 
has managed to distinguish itself from both Jew and Arab (…) and to render its 
role in the theologico-political distinction, in the separation and enmity of Jew and 
Arab invisible—invisible, perhaps most of all to and within ‘itself’?” (Anidjar 2008, 
36). Anidjar’s suggestion that the creation of the Israeli state and the so-called 
Middle East conflict have become a crucial site for European “political-theological” 
self-definitions is certainly applicable to Wilders’ anti-Islam populism: as I men-
tioned above, supporting the Israeli far-right is the Freedom Party’s primary for-
eign policy concern. And while Wilders used to distance himself strongly from 
other European far-right parties, in part, it seems, because of their anti-Semitism, 
he has recently been seeking alliances with other European far-right parties such 
as the Front National in France, which has toned down its anti-Semitic rhetoric 
and switched targets to Islam. However, while genealogies like the ones proposed 
by Anidjar are important, and while Wilders’ particular criticisms of Islam and the 
specifics of his Israel politics need to be historicized, Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
displacement of “the Jewish question” in “Elements of Anti-Semitism” also allows 
for an analysis of the way in which the distinction between the Dutch people and 
Muslims itself is enacted, through offense and ridicule, as a pathological manifes-





On a Saturday afternoon in January, 2016, Wilders visited the busy produce market 
on the central square of Spijkenisse, a town near Rotterdam where many people 
vote for Wilders’ Freedom Party, to hand out “resistance spray,” cans of red spray 
paint with which women were to defend themselves against “testosterone 
bombs.”23 Wilders used the mass sexual assaults in Cologne on the previous New 
Year’s Eve to claim that asylum seekers posed a “great danger” to “the Dutch 
women,” because many of them “have a morality, for instance when it comes to 
interacting with women, that is not our morality.” A group of about ten women 
protested Wilders’ action with signs and slogans like, “Wilders [is a] racist, not [a] 
feminist”; “Not in our name”; and “My feminism is anti-racist: emancipation for 
woman and refugee”; one of the protesters calmly addressed Wilders through a 
megaphone: “Dear mister Wilders, we applaud your great concern for the safety 
and rights of victims of sexist violence in the Netherlands...” The protesters pro-
voked angry shouting from Wilders’ supporters. A white man with a toddler on his 
arm was captured on camera, screaming past the ear of his crying child: “You want 
to be raped! You want to be raped! You are filthy! You are really fucking filthy! 
Bah! Bah! Bah bah bah! You want cock! You cannot get cock, because you are 
ugly!”24 Oddly, it was the feminist protesters who were arrested; the prosecutors 
decided months later not to prosecute them, but the arrests ended the demonstra-
tion. 
 
Commenters on social media were quick to ridicule the young father as an ignorant, 
anti-social, lower class individual with poor parenting skills.25 However, I hope to 
have demonstrated the importance of confronting the affective mechanism at work 
here: the man’s sexist rant was grounded in indignation about the feminists’ 
demonstration, and mirrors the rhetorical-affective phenomenon that is at the 
heart of Geert Wilders’ own political performances, namely that of giving and tak-
ing offense. But what the protesters were facing was not only the offensive rhetoric 
and the indignation of Wilders and his supporters, but also the repressive tolerance 
enforced by a mayor who tolerated Wilders and his supporters dominating the 
central public space in her town with his racist ideology, while having the protest-
ers arrested. 
 
To contest repressive tolerance, Marcuse urged his readers to “break the established 
universe of meaning” (Marcuse 1969, 98). However, breaking the established uni-
verse of meaning, the “public language” that neutralizes critique, is particularly 
challenging at a time when anti-Islam populists such as Wilders have themselves 
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appropriated the critique of tolerance, and present their politics of offense as re-
sistance against the “politically correct” public language. In addition, considerable 
parts of the public sphere have been poisoned by the nihilist maxim that “what can 
be offended must be offended,” which gained much traction in the Netherlands 
after the murders of anti-Islam politician Pim Fortuyn by an animal rights activist 
in 2002 and of filmmaker and self-proclaimed village idiot Theo van Gogh by a 
college drop-out-turned-Islamist in 2004 (“what can be offended must be of-
fended” might be considered Van Gogh’s life motto). The idea that indiscriminate 
offense is inherently critical has been monetized, among various other media, by 
the highly popular Dutch shocklog, Geenstijl, which adopts an expression of moral 
disapproval—dat is geen stijl, literally: that is styleless, i.e. it violates basic standards 
of decency—as a badge of honor, prides itself on being “tendentious, groundless, 
and gratuitously offensive” [nodeloos kwetsend], and encourages readers to post un-
filtered tirades in response to its sarcastic, ad hominem tabloid journalism, usually 
about politicians or celebrities who are deemed hypocritical or pretentious, or about 
women and minorities who are considered to manifest themselves too conspicu-
ously in the public sphere.26 Instead of creating a space for critique and discussion 
among an active public, Geenstijl produces a solitary virtual crowd of white, heter-
osexual, male, middle-class users who affirm the same exclusionary messages over 
and over again in monological reacties. 
 
Revisiting “Repressive Tolerance” and “Elements of Anti-Semitism” suggests that 
an effective contestation of this “public language” requires an engagement with the 
subjective and affective dimensions of politics, rather than a defense of “neutral” 
forms of liberalism that attempt to bracket or repress these dimensions altogether. 
Rereading “Repressive Tolerance” suggests that the freedom to offend needs to be 
reclaimed from anti-Islam populists like Wilders and from offense-for-the-sake-
of-offense nihilists, and mobilized, for instance, through public demonstrations 
that do not merely “express an opinion,” but that, in Marcuse’s terms, actively seek 
to enact a “rupture.” Thus, the feminist protesters in Spijkenisse sought to break 
the link established by Wilders between sexual assault and Muslims or immigrants, 
and between anti-Islam and anti-immigrant politics and feminism, by insisting on 
protesting at the produce market, where everyone could see them, disobeying ap-
parent orders to move the demonstration to a different location, refusing to tolerate 
a Wilders stunt that took place on a central location without noticeable contesta-
tion, and that Wilders’ racism was framed as a contribution to the “marketplace of 
ideas.” Reclaiming the freedom to offend might also imply breaking the taboo on 
calling Wilders a fascist, a taboo that is upheld not only by people arguing that 
comparisons with fascism are an affront to the memory of the victims of the Hol-
ocaust and an insult to the people who vote for Wilders, but also by liberals who 
argue that comparisons with fascism are too “loaded” to play a productive role in 
public discussion.27 
 
But revisiting “Repressive Tolerance” and “Elements of Anti-Semitism” also sug-
gests the importance of reclaiming the freedom to take offense and to express in-
dignation, that is, to insist on the need for nonrepressive sublimation. The freedom 
to take offense might be opposed to the sizeable “liberal” opinion industry that 
dismisses a wide array of social justice struggles as “identity politics,” complains 
that political correctness is the greatest problem of our time, and is obsessed with 
calls for trigger warnings and safe spaces on U.S. college campuses that, I would 
argue, are sometimes rather necessary. Obviously, Marcuse’s and Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s texts do not contain blueprints for political action, but I hope to have 
indicated some ways in which returning to the critical practice that they embody 
might help us move beyond simplistic analyses of populist affect, and contribute to 





1] I would like to thank Drucilla Cornell and Wout Cornelissen for their comments on earlier ver-
sions of this essay. 
 
2] For a lexicon of Wilders’ rhetoric, see Jan Kuitenbrouwer, De woorden van Wilders en hoe ze werken 
(Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2010). All translations of Wilders’ rhetoric are mine. 
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3] The subtitle of Wilders’ 2006 “Plan voor een nieuwe gouden eeuw” [Plan for a New Golden Age] 
translates as: “Lower taxes, smaller government, substantial improvement of middle incomes.” Wil-
ders, 2006. The title may have been conceived by analogy with William Kristol and Robert Kagan’s 
Project for the New American Century, which existed from 1997 to 2006. For an early analysis of 
the financial support for Wilders by anti-Islam foundations in the United States, see Freke Vuijst, 
2009. 
 
4] On December 9, 2016, the District Court in The Hague convicted Wilders of incitement to 
discrimination, without, however, imposing a penalty. 
 
5] Marcuse’s basic diagnosis of a change from an original to a lapsed or degenerated form of tolerance 
follows a familiar trope in Frankfurt School analyses of liberalism, for instance in Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (particularly the theses on anti-Semitism that I discuss below) 
and in Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An earlier critique that 
focuses specifically on the concept of tolerance is Erich Fromm’s “Die gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit 
der psychoanalytischen Therapie” (Fromm, 1935).  
 
6] The activists had been found not guilty in the first instance by the Tribunal Correctionnel de 
Mulhouse in December, 2011. 
 
7] This prohibition had been added to the 1881 law in 1972, to implement the 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
 
8] In February, 2010, the then Minister of Justice, Michèle Alliot-Marie, had issued a memo—the 
“circulaire Alliot-Marie”—requesting that prosecutors bring criminal charges against individuals call-
ing for a boycott of Israeli products. See Médard, 2015. 
 
9] Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, par. 56. I have analyzed this judgment in Bot, 2012. 
 
10] See, on this topic, also Brown, 2006. Brown barely mentions Marcuse’s essay, even though her 
critique of tolerance as a discourse of repression is quite similar to Marcuse’s. However, unlike Mar-
cuse’s essay, Brown’s Foucauldian discourse analysis does not contain an emancipatory alternative to 
“tolerance as a discourse of depoliticization”; “tolerance as a discourse of power”; “tolerance as gov-
ernmentality”; “tolerance as/in civilizational discourse,” to mention some of Brown’s chapter titles. 
Marcuse refers to the emancipatory alternative to repressive tolerance as “discriminatory,” “liberat-
ing,” or “universal” tolerance (Marcuse, 1969:107, 109, 111). 
 
11] The Dutch word for the human head is hoofd; a kop is an animal’s head. 
 
12] The neologism haardbaarden, “hearth beards,” sounds like haatbaarden, “hate beards.” Jan Kui-
tenbrouwer points out that members of parliament have to approve the transcripts before they are 
published, so that Wilders deliberately had the word haardbaarden be put on record. Kuitenbrouwer 
suggests that Wilders may have wanted to avoid a reprimand by the moderator, but it is more likely 
that he wanted to avoid another hate speech charge, even though it is dubious that a judge would 
make much of the difference. Kuitenbrouwer, 2010:96). 
 
13] “New Dutch”: a term denoting immigrants and their second and third generation descendents 
that was briefly used as an alternative for the stigmatizing word, allochtoon. Wilders here uses the 
term sarcastically. 
 
14] I have modified the translation throughout. 
 
15] Indeed, similarities between Marcuse’s work and Dialectic of Enlightenment led to considerable 
tensions. See Wiggershaus, 1994:497. 
 
16] Marcuse develops the concept of repressive desublimation most fully in One-Dimensional Man 
(Marcuse, 1991:56-83). In “Repressive Tolerance,” Marcuse analyzes repressive desublimation as a 
mechanism of depoliticization (Marcuse, 1969:115). 
 
17] I thank David Kettler for discussing Horkheimer and Adorno’s use of these stereotypes with me. 
 
18] Charles Coughlin (1891-1979) was a Canadian-born anti-Semitic radio preacher and Roman 
Catholic priest who migrated to the United States in 1923. 
 
19] Cf. Emmuska Orczy’s 1903 play and adventure novel, The Scarlet Pimpernel. Orczy herself was a 
baroness who was born in Hungary and escaped the threat of a revolution with her parents in 1868, 
ultimately to London. 
 
20] “Koranfilm Wilders heet Fitna,” Nu.nl February 9, 2008. 
 
21] On the relations between militant secularism and Islamic terror, see Roy, 2005. See also Scrog-
gins, 2012, which suggestively juxtaposes the biographies of an anti-Islam ideologist and an Islamic 
terrorist. Joost Bosland also discusses projection and polarizing identification in his diagnosis of the 
“madness around Wilders” (Bosland, 2010:70-1). 
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25] See, for instance: http://www.dumpert.nl/mediabase/6715913/eabe7992/tokkie_schreeuwt_jul-
lie_willen_verkracht_worden_tegen_feministen.html 
 
26] For a critique of this shocklog, see Lovink, 2008. 
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